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RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-VARILE ANNUITY HELD To BE SUBJECT
To FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION
United Benefit Life Insurance Company' offered a "flexible fund" annuity
under which the premiums were invested primarily in common stocks. A pur-
chaser was entitled to withdraw all or part of his proportionate share of the total
fund at any time before maturity. Alternatively he was guaranteed a cash value
measured by a percentage of his net premiums. At maturity, the purchaser could
elect to receive the cash value of his policy, measured by the larger of his inter-
est in the fund or the net premium guarantee, or he could elect to convert his
interest into a life annuity under conditions specified in the contract. The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission brought an action to enjoin United Benefit from
offering its "flexible fund" without complying with the registration requirements
of the Securities Act of 1933,2 and to compel United Benefit to register the fund
itself as an investment company, under the Investment Company Act of 1940.-
Judgment for the company was entered in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, and the Commission appealed. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia circuit affirmed, 4 and certiorari was granted.5 Re-
versing, the Supreme Court held, the deferred annuity contract was an "invest-
ment contract" within the terms of the Securities Act 6 and could not be offered
to the public without conforming to the registration requirements of the Act. 7
Securities and Exchange Commission v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company,
387 U.S. 202 (1967).
The Securities Act of 1933 was enacted to safeguard the investing public
from "fraudulent devices and tricks used in the sale of securities." 8 This Act
requires that "any note,... stock, . . . bond, . . . investment contract . . . or in
general any interest or investment commonly known as a security.. ."9 be regis-
tered10 and a prospectus published" before sale to the public. The Act's philoso-
phy is that full disclosure of information relating to the company's directors,
majority stockholders, capitalization, assets, liabilities, and estimated profits' 2
will allow investors to make more objective and intelligent decisions.'8 Though
Congress thought it necessary to regulate securities, they specifically exempted
insurance and annuity contracts from federal regulation.' 4 "Any insurance..
1. Hereinafter referred to as United Benefit.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
3. Id. § 80a-8.
4. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins., 359 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
5. 385 U.S. 918 (1965).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(i) (1964).
7. Id. § 77e.
8. Thorn v. Austin Silver Mining Co., 171 Misc. 400, 12 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1939).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)l (1964).
10. Id. § 77e.
11. Id. § 77j.
12. Id. § 77aa.
13. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1964).
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or annuity contract... issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the
insurance commissioner ... of any State .. ." is exempt from this registration
requirement. 15 To protect investors in investment companies from mismanage-
ment,16 the Investment Company Act of 194017 requires that companies
"investing, reinvesting, and trading in securities 'u s be registered before their
stock can be sold through interstate commerce.' 9 Even though insurance com-
panies are investment companies, they are exempt from this federal regulatory
requirement. 20 Federal securities regulation, which emphasizes disclosure, is
improper for insurance regulation.21 An insurance policyholder is not as
concerned with the company's investment or management policies as he is with
"the solvency and adequacy of the company's reserves;" '22 that is, whether the
company will be able to meet its future obligation to him. While the philosophy
of federal securities regulation is disclosure, the philosophy of state insurance
regulation is more paternalistic. State insurance regulation attempts to safe-
guard the best interests of the policyholders, rather than leaving them to care
for themselves. By controlling the investment policies of insurance companies,
23
insurance commissions can assure policyholders that the companies will in fact
have adequate reserves to meet their obligations. In 1869,24 the Supreme Court
held the issuing of a policy of insurance not to be a transaction of commerce,
and that its regulation should be left to the states. In 1943,25 perhaps influenced
by violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act 26 by the insurance industry,2 7 the
Supreme Court reversed this previous decision. Not wanting the burden of federal
regulation, the insurance industry's powerful lobby caused Congress to enact
the McCarren-Ferguson Act,28 which states: "No Act of Congress shall be con-
strued to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance .... "2 Apparently underlying
this preservation of state power was the premise that the states had superior
experience and adequate legislation to regulate insurance.
30
Having a guarantee of fixed periodic payments for life,3 ' the purchaser of
an ordinary annuity receives protection against outliving his capital. The com-
15. Id.
16. Breswick & Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 80 (1964).
18. Id. § 80a-3(a) (1).
19. Id. § 80a-8.
20. Id. § 80a-6(a) (8).
21. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 77 (1959).
22. Id.
23. E.g., N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 79-89 (1966).
24. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
25. United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
27. See 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. at 670.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1964).
29. Id. § 1012(b).
30. Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 562, 563 (1958).
31. See Johnson, The Variable Annuity: What It Is And Why It Is Needed, 1956
Ins. L.J. 357; Johnson, The Variable Annuity-Insurance, Investment, or Both? 48 Geo. L.J.
641 (1959); Haussermann, The Security in Variable Annuities, 1956 Ins. L.J. 382.
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pany issuing the annuity invests the annuitant's capital in fixed-yield debt in-
struments and actuarially calculates how much of the principal and income will
be needed to meet these payments for the duration of the annuitant's expected
life.32 Variable annuities, one of the insurance industry's more recent develop-
ments, are intended to meet the need for a retirement plan which will guarantee
payments until death, as does an ordinary annuity, yet provide for appreciation
of capital, as a share of common stock.33 The variable annuity resembles the
ordinary annuity in that it presumably shifts the risk of outliving capital to the
issuing company, but the annuitant receives no guarantee of fixed payments.
Instead the annuitant purchases units corresponding to his proportionate share
in a fund that is primarily invested in common stocks. The annuitant's periodic
payments are based on his proportionate share in the fluctuating fund. Apprecia-
tion of the total assets through capital gains will increase the value of his inter-
est, and thus protect him against inflation. However, either a sharp decline in the
market or poor company management will cause the annuitant's payments to be
small, or possibly nothing; 34 therefore, the annuitant bears the entire risk of
adverse investment experience.35 Because of this dual nature, the variable annu-
ity has created substantial problems as to the proper scope of federal securities
regulation. 36 In determining if federal securities regulation is appropriate, the
Supreme Court, in SEC v. Joiner,37 considered the character of the instrument
as determined by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the eco-
nomic inducements held out to the prospect. For purposes of the Securities Act,
an investment contract is a transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise, and is led to expect profits solely from manage-
ment by a third party.38 Because a variable annuity possesses these characteristics
of a security, federal securities regulation seems applicable. However, the refund
of premiums in case of death before maturity, in addition to standard incontesta-
bility and assignment clauses,39 tends to give variable annuity characteristics of
insurance so that state insurance regulation seems applicable. The Supreme
Court first considered the problem of the variable annuity in the the case of SEC
v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company (VALIC). 40 The Securities and
Exchange Commission brought an action to enjoin VALIC from offering its
annuity contracts to the public without registering them under the Securities
Act and the Investment Company Act. VALIC claimed it was selling a form of
32. Note, Regulation of Variable Annuity Sales: The Aftermath of SEC v. VALIC,
1959 Wash. L.Q. 206, 209.
33. Comment, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1374, 1375 (1963).
34. Note, supra note 32, at 210.
35. Id. at 210 n.39 gives a mathematical example of the workings of a variable annu-
ity under different market conditions. See also Mearns, The Commission, The Variable
Annuity, and the Inconsiderate Sovereign, 45 Va. L. Rev. 831, 835, (1959).
36. Comment, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1374, 1376 (1963).
37. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352 (1943).
38. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
39. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 205 n.5 (1967).
40. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
VALIC].
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insurance and was therefore exempt from federal securities regulation. The
Court stated that it would not undertake to limit the concepts of insurance to
what they were when the federal regulatory acts were first passed. However, the
concept of insurance involves investment risk-taking on the part of an insurance
company, and the issuer of a variable annuity that has no element of a fixed
return has assumed no true risk in the insurance sense. Because VALIC did not
offer its purchasers any guarantee of a fixed return, the Court held the variable
annuity was not insurance, and therefore was not entitled to the insurance ex-
emption from federal regulation. As a result of this decision, the Prudential Life
Insurance Company, anticipating the sale of variable annuities as a part of its
regular business, applied to the Securities and Exchange Commission for exemp-
tion from the requirements of the Investment Company Act.41 Prudential
claimed that it was entitled to exemption under the Act's definition of "insurance
company, '4 2 for, unlike VALIC, it was not formed for the purpose of selling
variable annuities, but was an existing company engaged primarily in the busi-
ness of insurance. The Commission, in refusing the exemption, held that "if an
insurance company sells equity interests to the public and creates an investnient
fund, the insurance company exemption from federal regulation does not carry
over to the investment fund which is treated as a separate entity." 43 In affirming
the decision, the United States Court of Appeals44 emphasized that Prudential
would not assume any investment risk, as all insurance must if it is to be exempt
from federal securities regulation. Following the decisions in VALIC and Pn1-
dential, United Benefit offered its "flexible fund" to the public. The "flexible
fund" is a deferred, or optional annuity plan having characteristics somewhat
similar to those of the variable annuity, which the Supreme Court in VALIC
had held to be subject to the Securities Act. The main difference was that the
"flexible fund" did guarantee some fixed payments to the annuitant based on a
percentage of his net premiums. Because of these differences United Benefit
claimed it was eligible for the insurance exemption of the Securities Act,4 5 and
that the fund itself was entitled to the "insurance company" exemption of the
Investment Company Act.46 The Securities and Exchange Commission contended
that the portion of the "flexible fund" which dealt with the pre-maturity period
was separable and a security within the meaning of the Securities Act. Both
United Benefit and the Commission agreed that the provisions dealing with the
operation of the fixed payment annuity were purely conventional insurance
41. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6 (1964): "a . . . the following companies are exempt from
the provisions of this subchapter: (5) Any company which ...is organized and operating
under the insurance laws of any State ... .
42. Id. § 2(a)(17): "Insurance Company means a company which is organized as an
insurance company, whose primary and predominant business activity is the writing of
insurance or the reinsuring of risks underwritten by insurance companies, and which is
subject to supervision by the insurance commissioner .. .of a State."
43. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 3620
(Jan. 22, 1963).
44. Prudential Ins. Co. v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3rd Cir. 1964).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77c-a(8).
46. Id. § 80a-6(a)(5) (1964).
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terms, and thus beyond the purview of the Commission. The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the guarantee of a fixed-
payment annuity of a substantial amount gave the entire contract the character
of insurance. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,47 in affirming,
rejected the Commission's basic premise that the contract should be fragmented
and that the risk during the deferred period only should be considered.
In reversing, the Supreme Court found that United Benefit had not assumed
a substantial investment risk. During the first portion of the "flexible fund" con-
tract, United Benefit promised to serve as an investment agency, allowing the
policyholder to share in its investment experience. At maturity, United Benefit
was obligated to produce no more than a guaranteed minimum. However, this
minimum was so low that the risk of not being able to meet it was insignificant.
In holding that the "flexible fund" need not be characterized in its entirety, the
Court found that the contract contained distinct and separable promises that
came into being at a fixed point in time. The second portion of the contract,
which gave the annuitant his choice of either his cash value in the fund or a
regular life annuity, came into being at the end of the investment contract. The
Court assessed independently the operation of the "flexible fund" during the
deferred period to determine whether that separable portion of the contract fell
within the insurance exemption of the Securities Act, and if not, whether the
contract constituted a "security" as defined by the Act. In finding that the
"flexible fund" did not fall within the insurance exemption of the Securities Act,
the Court said that while the guarantee of a cash value based on net premiums
substantially reduced the investment risk, the assumption of some investment
risk does not by itself create an insurance provision for federal regulatory pur-
poses. Using the test of the Joiner case,48 the Court held that the accumulation
provisions constituted an "investment contract" within the terms of the Securi-
ties Act, that the purchaser of such a plan should be afforded the same advan-
tages of disclosure which inure to a mutual fund purchaser, and that this
portion of the fund does constitute a "security" under the Securities Act. The
Court then noted that, unlike VALIC, United Benefit was essentially an insur-
ance company, exempt from the requirements of the Investment Company Act.
This exemption made it difficult for the Court to decide whether the "flexible
fund" could be separated from United Benefit's other activities and considered
an "investment company" in and of itself. The Court, also concerned with possi-
ble conflicts between federal securities regulation and state insurance regulation,
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for
further proceedings consistent with their opinion.
In deciding United Benefit and the problem of how to regulate the variable
annuity, the Supreme Court was faced with conflicting statutes. 49 Thus far, the
47. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 359 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
48. See text at supra note 35.
49. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1964); Investment Company Act of 1940,
15 US.C. § 80a (1964); McCarren-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1958).
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Court has suggested three approaches to resolving this conflict. The first is to
treat the variable annuity as a security, subject to federal securities regulation.
This approach was taken by the majority in VALIC. A second alternative is to
view the variable annuity as a new concept in insurance, subject to state insur-
ance regulation. This approach was taken by the dissent in VALIC. A third
approach is to treat the variable annuity as a combination of security and
insurance, subject to both federal securities and state insurance regulation. This
was suggested by the Court in United Benefit. These approaches suggest that
the Court is attempting to place the regulation of variable annuities into one or
more of the existing systems of securities or insurance regulation. In making
this determination, it appears that the Court is looking to the characteristics of
the instrument, rather than the interests of the variable annuity policyholder.
The purchaser of a variable annuity is interested in a policy that will best meet
the needs of himself and his family. He wants to be able to rely on the issuing
company and to trust its salesmen. Realistically, federal securities regulation
does not pass on the merits of the company, the effectiveness of the policy, or
the integrity of the salesmen. Federal securities regulation promotes disclosure.
In order to make investment decisions based on the information disclosed a cer-
tain degree of investment sophistication is required which the purchaser of a vari-
abe annuity would probably not have."0 Not being able to understand the
disclosed information, federal securities regulation may be useless to the average
annuitant. Although the Investment Company Act does to some extent regulate
the investment activities of companies that might issue variable annuities, 1 most
variable annuities are sold by insurance companies which are specifically exempt
from this statute.52 The paternalistic attitude of most insurance laws give the
annuitant the needed protection against ineffective policies, dishonest salesmen
and fraudulent companies. Therefore, it appears that state insurance regulation
would offer the annuitant more protection and eliminate the unnecessary burden
of dual regulation. Absent minimum government standards, however, this ap-
proach would not lend itself to uniformity of regulation. State regulation of
variable annuities gives the insurance companies an unfair advantage over
mutual funds which sell a nearly identical investment, but are subject to federal
regulation. For these reasons, perhaps state regulation of variable annuities is
not the ideal solution.
Although not discussed by the Court, a 1964 amendment58 to the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934,54 appears to offer an alternative solution to the
problem of regulating the variable annuity. In essence, the amendment provides
that if an insurance company is regulated by a state insurance commission which
50. Johnson, The Variable Annuity: What It Is And Why It Is Needed, 1956 Ins. L.].
357.
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-12, 13 (1964).
52. Id. § 80a-6(a) (5).
53. Id. § 78(g) (2) (G). See Philips & Shipman, Analysis of the Securities Act Asend-
ments of 1964, 1964 Duke L.J. 706, 747.
54. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
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meets minimum government standards, then any security issued by that com-
pany is exempt from federal regulation. If, however, the Commission prevails in
its contention that variable annuities are subject to registration under the Invest-
ment Company Act,5 5 then questions concerning the applicability of this amend-
ment become academic because it does not apply to any security issued by an
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act. Should the
courts hold that the Investment Company Act does not apply to variable annu-
ities issued by insurance companies, then these companies would in most cases
be exempt from federal regulation because of the amendment. It could be argued,
however, that the variable annuity is not exempt because it is issued not by the
insurance company, but by the "separate entity" created pursuant to the vari-
able annuity contract. This position was sustained in the Prudential Life Insur-
ance case,60 with respect to registration under the Investment Company Act.
For purposes of the Securities Act of 1933, the issuer of a variable annuity is
considered to be the insurance company rather than the separate entity. This
position, based on the definition of "issuer" contained in section 2 (4) of the
Securities Act,57 assures that there will be a financially responsible party avail-
able for purposes of the civil liability provisions of section 1168 of the Securities
Act. Furthermore, it can be argued that the purpose of the insurance company
exemption in the 1964 amendment of the Securities and Exchange Act is to avoid
dual state-federal regulation of insurance. In view of the requirements of the
McCarren-Ferguson Act, the exemption from federal regulation contained in the
Investment Company Act, the 1964 amendment to the Securities and Exchange
Act, and the unnecessary burden of dual regulation, variable annuities such as
the "flexible fund," should be regulated solely by the state insurance commis-
sions. However, the nature of the industry gives rise to the need for adequate
protection of the public, a type of protection which cannot be offered solely
through existing state insurance or federal securities regulations. A combination
of these existing systems appears to create more problems than it would solve.
It seems, therefore, that the proper solution to the problem of regulating sales
of the variable annuity will eventually come only through a federal administra-
tive agency created to meet the problems of the insurance industry.
RONALD J. AXELROD
55. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
56. Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77b-4 (1964).
58. Id. § 77k.
